In the first half of the twentieth century there was a remarkable convergence of art and design in De Stijl, Constructivism and the Bauhaus. Via such movements art was It is no accident that both Tzara's instructions for the making of a Dadaist poem and Breton's for the writing of automatic texts have the character of recipes. This represents not only a polemical attack on the individual creativity of the artist; the recipe is to be taken quite literally as suggesting a possible activity on the part of the recipient. The automatic texts also should be read as guides to individual production. But such production is not to be understood as artistic production, but as part of a liberating life praxis. This is what is meant by Breton's demand that poetry be practiced (pratiquer la poesie).
The following passage from Bürger's analysis, in particular, provides considerable insight:
It is no accident that both Tzara's instructions for the making of a Dadaist poem and Breton's for the writing of automatic texts have the character of recipes. This represents not only a polemical attack on the individual creativity of the artist; the recipe is to be taken quite literally as suggesting a possible activity on the part of the recipient. The automatic texts also should be read as guides to individual production. But such production is not to be understood as artistic production, but as part of a liberating life praxis. This is what is meant by Breton's demand that poetry be practiced (pratiquer la poesie).
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Bürger argues that the methodologies developed by Dada and Surrealism entail interactivity. But this is not the case because it is the notion of bringing poetry into everyday life that is fundamental, not the notion of interactivity. The notion of bringing poetry into everyday life is quintessentially romantic. And in order to comprehend this idea we have to identify the most basic premises of romanticism which are: first, the creativity of the unconscious mind; and, second, the aesthetics of the sublime and its relationship with the noumenal. One can certainly argue that Bergson's admission that rational consciousness is a product of evolution reveals that his critique of science is flawed because it is in fact possible to deconstruct specific natural phenomena and reconstruct them in a manner that is fully functional. 13 The discovery of the genetic code, after Bergson, has emphasised that nature is essentially componential and combinatorial as well as being dynamic and interconnected. 
But what is valuable in Capitalism and Schizophrenia is Deleuze and
Guattari's recourse to chaos theory and their concept of the "machinic". Unlike
Nietzsche or Bergson they accept that the creativity of evolution should be understood in terms of the production of machines. The first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Anti-Oedipus, begins "Everywhere it is machines-real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections". 21 Machinic machines, however, are not ordinary machines, they are impelled by desire, by something akin to
Bergson's universal vital impulsion. 22 The romantic/postromantic focus on a sacred desiring force at the core of nature is an anthropocentric, mythopoetic construction that has no basis in science not even in the most counter-mechanistic science of complexity theory. Although Deleuze and Guattari appropriate chaos theory they do so in order to assimilate it into a poetic construction that is fundamentally informed by a romanticist inclination to figure nature as sacred where the sacred is characterised in terms of desire, a cosmic striving for life diametrically opposed to the coldness of rationalistic functionalism. The mystery of the evolution of life lies in the combinatoriality of molecules which in turn arise out of the combinatoriality of subatomic particles that allow the creation of atoms. In particular we can think of the curious lengths that molecular evolution had to go to in order to produce the building blocks of life that are proteins.
Proteins are complex enfolded polymeric chains composed of amino acid sequences.
A manifold of proteins with a vast variety of physical characteristics and biochemical functions can be produced from a repertoire of only twenty amino acids. But to produce the protein combinatoire evolution had to invent the genetic code through a process Christian de Duve describes as "molecular selection". 25 Even though nature does not have foresight it is indeed a remarkable coincidence that when chains of nucleobases such as adenine, guanine, uracil, and cytosine link together they can create a template for the production of the most structurally complex molecules that are proteins. There may be no foresight, no question of actually designing the biomolecular building blocks of life, but it does appear that we are dealing with a remarkably serendipitous combinatoire wherein chance interactions between prebiotic molecules are accompanied by the promise of remarkable functional structures: first, proteins; second, single-celled organisms;
third, multicellular organisms; and fourth, nervous systems and brains.
Deleuze and Guattari use the term "double articulation" to describe the relationship between nucleobases and the amino acids that constitute proteins.
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Double articulation is a term taken from semiotics which refers to the combinatorial nature of language wherein a finite set of sounds and syntactic rules can produce a manifold of combinations. 27 But double articulation proliferates: language is composed not only of the syntagmatic dimension of phonemes and syntactic rules but also the paradigmatic dimension of metaphor and so we might speak of a second doubling. Then we can add the dimension of speech acts which leads to third doubling. In addition there is the process of usage wherein language evolves "molecularly" as sounds alter, new words are formed and syntactic rules transform via mutation. The more we examine language the more levels of articulation appear:
expanding into fractal doublings-of-doublings en abyme that evoke Feigenbaum's famous diagram of period doubling; 28 culture and nature intersect.
Why and how molecular components can interconnect to create increasingly complex machines is currently inexplicable even by the mysterious emergence of attractors that enable self-organised criticality because extraordinary serendipity also plays a role. 29 But despite such mystery to have recourse to a romantic anthropocentric thesis that life emerged out of a cosmic desiring impulse seems radically unnecessary.
Evolution provides a model for the achievement of a synthesis between the practical demands of society and the postromantic demand for a poetics of the sublime. Evolution understood in terms of complexity theory is redolent with sublimity. But despite the fact that complexity theory is counter-mechanistic it does not replace the venerable scientific methodology of analytical reductionism; instead it complements it. Moreover, complexity theory is not concerned with sacralising the sublimity of nature in the manner of romantic and postromantic aesthetics.
Accordingly it offers aesthetics a desacralised notion of the sublime.
A complexity theoretical framework allows a reconciliation of the sublimity of evolution with the practical-functional. We can return to Bergson's admission that rational analysis is the product of evolution. 30 Evolutionary process is sublime but it is also practical-functional. As Deleuze and Guattari admit, evolution leads to the production of machines; but we do not have to follow their sacralisation of the machinic via the anthropocentric projection of human desire onto cosmic process. Guattari's machinic aesthetics that reconciles sublimity with functionality might be as successful in bringing art into life as was the machine aesthetic in the first half of the twentieth century. 3 The use of the term "resentful" here refers both to Rousseau's notion of amour-propre (pride) and Nietzsche's notion of ressentiment. 4 Frederick C. Beiser notes "Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, and Schleiermacher all lamented the utilitarianism of modern culture, its tendency to value things only as a means to physical happiness. What the bourgeois cannot consume does not exist for them. Naturally, this leaves no place for the higher values of life, philosophy, art, and religion. Even worse, it demeans social relationships, treating them as a means of achieving mutual benefit or advantage. The romantics employed a redolent word for someone who is devoted to the materialist ethic of modern society: the philistine (der Philister). The philistine will act only for the sake of comfort; he saw art as only a form of entertainment, and religion simply as an opiate he could turn to in distress. He would transform all of his life into a repetitive routine and conform to the moral, religious, and political status quo as long as it satisfies the craving for comfort and security. The purpose of life for the philistine is simply to exist and propagate. The romantics saw philistinism as the inevitable result of the modern economy. The increasing division of labor, the constant quest for profit, and the development of technology not only satisfied basic needs but created new ones. Hence the treadmill of economic life had become self-perpetuating." Frederick C. 7 It is also not surprising that after Bürger's assertion that Dada and Surrealism initiate the turn away from the postromantic discourse of l'art pour l'art he concludes that the project was a failure because it was coopted by the fine art gallery system: "Once the signed bottle drier has been accepted as an object that deserves a place in a museum, the provocation no longer provokes; it turns into its opposite. If an artist today signs a stove pipe and exhibits it, that artist certainly does not denounce the art market but adapts to it. Such adaptation does not eradicate the idea of individual creativity, it affirms it …" Bürger, Avant-Garde, 52. One can add that such cooption is the inevitable consequence of a separation of art and design. 10 Admittedly this summary of such philosophies is somewhat reductive. For example, although Nietzsche does not connect chance with evolution, the relationship between his concept of chance and his theory of the eternal return effectively characterises chance as something akin to a form shaping force. William Mackintire Salter observes that for Nietzsche there is order in chance due to the fact that the endless throws of the dice lead to "a semblance of succession or order … in the world, despite its chance nature-or rather just because of this, for the recurrence is entirely a matter of accident and necessity, not the result of any design or ordering will. For example, the Miller-Urey experiment shows that electric sparks in an atmosphere of methane, ammonia and hydrogen can create the amino acid components that make up the most structurally complex molecules of life that are proteins. But the Miller-Urey experiment does not produce nucleic acids. This is problematic because proteins cannot be created until nucleic acids polymerise into RNA and RNA complexifies into the protein producing mechanism that is the ribosome, the veritable egg of life. The extraordinary role of chance in the evolution of life is evident in current research which indicates that the nucleobase components of RNA and DNA arrived from space via meteorites; see Adam Rutherford, The Cell, (London: BBC Four, 2009), Part 3: "The Spark of Life", broadcast 26 August. Even allowing for this extraordinary serendipity the question of how nucleobases linked up to form RNA and how RNA formed the egg of life that is the RNA-ribosome remains a mystery. No experiment has been able to produce RNA in the manner of the Miller-Urey experiment let alone the complex RNA configuration that is the ribosome. All that has been achieved is George Church's post factum analysis of a bacterial ribosome into its fundamental components followed by a successful reconstruction of functioning ribosomes in a test tube (see note 13 above). In spite of our detailed analytical knowledge of amino acid and nucleic acid chemistry the origin of life 3.5 billion years ago remains a sublime mystery. 30 "the intellectual tendencies innate to-day, which life must have created in the course of its evolution, are not at all meant to supply us with an explanation of life: they have something else to do" Bergson, Creative Evolution, 21. 31 It seems inevitable that the groundbreaking Miller-Urey experiment will be followed up with another experiment that will reveal how RNA was formed and how the RNA-ribosome protein producing factory that is the egg of life came into being. It is highly unlikely that there is any need to posit a "cosmic egg" composed entirely of desiring intensity that lies outside of the dimensions of space as is the case in Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the body without organs in Capitalism and Schizophrenia (see note 20 above). 32 One thinks here of Hilbert space: a multidimensional vector space. 33 Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 254-255. Keith Ansell-Pearson notes that the plane of immanence which is also a "plane of consistency" is a "flat multidimensional surface". Keith Ansell-Pearson, 
